> [!abstract] > The Categories [...] is a text from Aristotle's *Organon* that enumerates all the possible kinds of things that can be the subject or the predicate of a proposition. [...] > > The Categories places every object of human apprehension under one of ten categories (known to medieval writers as the Latin term *praedicamenta*). Aristotle intended them to enumerate everything that can be expressed without composition or structure, thus anything that can be either the subject or the predicate of a proposition. ### Four-fold division (the *antepraedicamenta*) --- Adapted from "Aristotle’s Categories" (2021). | | Universals | Particulars | | -------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | **Accidental** | **Accidental universals** are properties or characteristics that something has, but which are not essential to its nature. They can change without altering what the thing fundamentally is. For example: being tall. A person can be tall, but their identity as a person doesn’t depend on their height. | **Accidental particulars** refer to specific, individual occurrences of accidental properties. They are tied to a particular object but are not essential to its being. For example: "Socrates’ current tan" is an accidental particular. Socrates might be tanned right now, but he’s still Socrates whether he’s tan or pale. | | **Essential** | **Essential universals** are characteristics or properties that define what something is and are necessary for it to exist as that thing. For example: for a triangle, "having three sides" is an essential universal. Without three sides, it wouldn’t be a triangle. | **Non-accidental particulars** are the foundational, individual entities that exist independently and serve as the basis for all other categories. They are "what something is" at its core. For example: this oak tree in my backyard. This oak tree is a distinct, unique entity. It exists independently and is not defined by its changing properties, such as the number of leaves it has or whether it is currently blooming. Those changing properties (like "being green" or "having fallen leaves") are accidental, but the tree itself—the specific oak tree—is the non-accidental particular. | ### Ten-fold division (the *praedicamenta*) --- Adapted from Wikipedia (2024). 1. **Substance** (οὐσία, *ousia*, essence or substance). Substance is that which cannot be predicated of anything or be said to be in anything. Hence, this particular man or that particular tree are substances. Later in the text, Aristotle calls these particulars “primary substances”, to distinguish them from secondary substances, which are universals and can be predicated. Hence, Socrates is a primary substance, while man is a secondary substance. Man is predicated of Socrates, and therefore all that is predicated of man is predicated of Socrates. 2. **Quantity** (ποσόν, *poson*, how much). This is the extension of an object, and may be either discrete or continuous. Further, its parts may or may not have relative positions to each other. All medieval discussions about the nature of the continuum, of the infinite and the infinitely divisible, are a long footnote to this text. It is of great importance in the development of mathematical ideas in the medieval and late Scholastic period. Examples: two cubits long, number, space, (length of) time. 3. **Qualification or quality** (ποιόν, *poion*, of what kind or quality). This determination characterizes the nature of an object. Examples: white, black, grammatical, hot, sweet, curved, straight. 4. **Relative** (πρός τι, *pros ti*, toward something). This is the way one object may be related to another. Examples: double, half, large, master, knowledge. 5. **Where or place** (ποῦ, *pou*, where). Position in relation to the surrounding environment. Examples: in a marketplace, in the Lyceum. 6. **When or time** (πότε, *pote*, when). Position in relation to the course of events. Examples: yesterday, last year. 7. **Relative position, posture, attitude** (κεῖσθαι, *keisthai*, to lie). The examples Aristotle gives indicate that he meant a condition of rest resulting from an action: ‘Lying’, ‘sitting’, ‘standing’. Thus position may be taken as the end point for the corresponding action. The term is, however, frequently taken to mean the relative position of the parts of an object (usually a living object), given that the position of the parts is inseparable from the state of rest implied. 8. **Having or state, condition** (ἔχειν, *echein*, to have or be). The examples Aristotle gives indicate that he meant a condition of rest resulting from an affection (i.e. being acted on): ‘shod’, ‘armed’. The term is, however, frequently taken to mean the determination arising from the physical accoutrements of an object: one's shoes, one's arms, etc. Traditionally, this category is also called a habitus (from Latin habere, to have). 9. **Doing or action** (ποιεῖν, *poiein*, to make or do). The production of change in some other object (or in the agent itself qua other). 10. **Being affected or affection** (πάσχειν, *paschein*, to suffer or undergo). The reception of change from some other object (or from the affected object itself qua other). Aristotle's name *paschein* for this category has traditionally been translated into English as "affection" and "passion" (also "passivity"), easily misinterpreted to refer only or mainly to affection as an emotion or to emotional passion. For action he gave the example, ‘to lance’, ‘to cauterize’; for affection, ‘to be lanced’, ‘to be cauterized.’ His examples make clear that action is to affection as the active voice is to the passive voice — as acting is to being acted on. >[!related] >- **North** (upstream): — >- **West** (similar): [[Padārtha]] >- **East** (different): — >- **South** (downstream): —