>[!abstract] >Definition goes here ## Evolution in the context of theodicy Darwin’s successful theory of evolution through natural selection intersects with the problem of [[Theodicy|theodicy]]. Central to theodicy is that the evil we observe in our universe is incompatible with a god that is both omnipotent (all-powerful) and benevolent. Either that god cannot prevent evil (thus he is not omnipotent), or he does not care to avoid it (thus he is not benevolent, at least not in the first order that we can understand). Let’s assume here a god that is omnipotent, but also not benevolent. That god may cause evil himself, or merely tolerate its existence from other causes that he lets happen. In both scenarios, that god might be evil himself (i.e., proactively wanting to induce suffering), or he might yield a *necessary evil* to serve some higher purpose (though it is difficult for us to imagine such a purpose being preferable to a universe devoid of evil). In both cases, that god could use evolution as the mean to inject (or at least tolerate) evil into the world. It no longer matters at this point of this [[Gedanken|gedanken]] whether that god deliberately seeks out evil or merely adopts a laissez-faire attitude toward the universe after setting its initial conditions. Darwinian evolution, as we know it, results in long-term improvements to the environmental fitness of species, which is a desirable outcome. But it also does so at the expense of vast amounts of waste, in the form of mutations that decrease any given individual’s fitness, causing suffering and premature deaths. This is because the process is seemingly [[Serendipity|seredendipitous]]. By letting such an unguided process play the cosmic lottery with organisms, that god is accepting more suffering than if he was to actively design each organism for maximum fitness. In this specific context, evil can be seen as an accidental byproduct of evolution; a baby born with a malformation, for instance, is a necessary price to pay for the slow improvements to our species’ fitness over time. This seems true for all *accidental evil*: birth defects, pathologies of the body and the mind, car accidents, plane crashes, house fires. But the case can also be made for *deliberate evil* that results from a being deliberately imposing harm on others. Here we can make yet another useful branching. A predator eating its prey is objectively harmful to the latter, which makes it a form of evil even if we commonly view it as natural (in absurdum, imagine a universe where an organism’s sustenance did not come at the expense of eating others). Let’s call this form of evil *deliberate, but justifiable* (again, in the specific context of a universe where there is no livable alternative). In this category we can also include cases of self-defense (e.g., killing someone before they kill us — still a net infliction of harm) and societally-legitimate violence (e.g., a soldier killing an enemy; which usually also involves self-defense from one side, just institutionalized). A being spontaneously inflicting harm on another, however, is *deliberate but unjustifiable*. This includes all forms of illegitimate violence, such as assault, murder, and rape. “Evil” here encompasses both accidental suffering (e.g., a baby born with a deformation, a plane crash) and deliberate suffering (e.g., sin and all forms of harm that beings deliberately impose on others). I find it an interesting expansion of evolution to include in its outcomes all forms of deliberate evil (e.g., murder, rape); not just the immediate lack of fitness to the environment. ![[Dillard, 1999#^c3acf1|clean]] >[!quote] >It’s hard to imagine that human engineers could be any messier or clumsier than that old spatters Dame Nature. The normal processes of evolution are wasteful and cruel in stupefying degree. Dame Nature considers every species and every individual expendable, and has indeed expended them in horrifying numbers. Even an occasional calamitous error in planned development could scarcely match the slaughter, millenium in, millenium out, of fumble-fingered Nature (Ettinger as cited by [[Regis, 1990]]). >[!related] >- **North** (upstream): — >- **West** (similar): — >- **East** (different): — >- **South** (downstream): — ![[related.base|no-toolbar]]