>[!abstract] >The Gettier problem, in the field of epistemology, is a landmark philosophical problem concerning the understanding of descriptive knowledge. Attributed to American philosopher Edmund Gettier, Gettier-type counterexamples (called "Gettier-cases") challenge the long-held justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge, [which holds] that knowledge is equivalent to justified true belief; if all three conditions (justification, truth, and belief) are met of a given claim, then we have knowledge of that claim. In his 1963 three-page paper titled "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", [...] Gettier claims to have shown that the JTB account is inadequate because it does not account for all of the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge (Wikipedia, 2024). >[!quote] >A novice may overestimate the probability that the next card will win her the hand, bet big, get lucky, and win, but winning doesn’t retroactively make her foolish bet wise. Conversely, a pro may correctly see that there is a high probability of winning the hand, bet big, get unlucky, and lose, but that doesn’t mean her bet was unwise ([[Tetlock & Gardner, 2015]]). >[!quote] >"He who predicts the future lies even if he tells the truth" ([[Schwartz, 1991]]). >[!quote] >"I do think Gettier's paper does a very good job of illustrating the situation that I refer to as 'being right for the wrong reasons'. This situation has important implications for prediction-making and hence for the art of rationality as a whole" ([[katydee, 2013]]). >[!note] >This is one of the most fundamental epistemological problems to me. Very often I observe people (dishearteningly) whose predictions turned out to be correct, but only because of luck, not because the justification for their belief was founded. The [[survivorship bias]] and the [[Texas sharpshooter fallacy]] take care of those cases where they were incorrect. Gettier's position (that justified true beliefs are not sufficient to pass as knowledge) seems obvious to me, so I need to dig deeper into the subsequent objections. >[!related] >- **North** (upstream): — >- **West** (similar): [[Howler]] >- **East** (different): — >- **South** (downstream): [[Moral luck]]