>[!abstract] >Material constitution is a relation [...] between two material objects when one is made up of the other, as when a statue is made up of a lump of clay or a coin is made up of a piece of copper. (Constitution is often contrasted with *composition*, a relation obtaining between one object and a plurality of objects that are the parts of that object.) Much of the philosophical interest in constitution involves the question of whether the constituted object is identical to the object that constitutes it. *Monists* say that they are identical, often citing the fact that the objects coincide spatially and/or mereologically. *Pluralists* say that they are (numerically) distinct, often citing differences in their modal or temporal properties. Since there are powerful reasons for accepting each of these views, the issue is sometimes framed as the "puzzle,” "paradox,” or "problem” of material constitution ([[Korman, 2021]]). >[!related] >- **North** (upstream): [[Metaphysics of objects]] >- **West** (similar): [[Mereology]] (study of part–whole relations) >- **East** (different): [[Identity theory]] (the view that constitution just is identity) >- **South** (downstream): [[The debtor's paradox]], [[The puzzle of Dion and Theon]], [[Statue-clay problem]], [[Ship of Theseus]]