>[!abstract] >Pascal’s wager is a pragmatic argument for belief in God, proposed by Blaise Pascal in the 17th century, which frames faith as a rational "bet" under conditions of uncertainty. Since the potential gain of believing (eternal salvation) is infinite and the loss finite, while the potential loss of disbelief (eternal damnation) is infinite, Pascal argues that it is safer to believe than not. The wager is not a proof of God’s existence but a decision-theoretic appeal to self-interest in the face of unknowable outcomes. Critics challenge it on grounds of sincerity, multiple possible deities, and reducing faith to utility calculus, but it remains a foundational thought experiment in philosophy of religion and probability. >[!quote]- Original quote >Examinons donc ce point et disons : Dieu est ou il n’est pas. Mais de quel côté pencherons‑nous ? La raison n’y peut rien déterminer. Il y a un chaos infini qui nous sépare. Il se joue un jeu à l’extrémité de cette distance infinie, où il arrivera croix ou pile. Que gagerez‑vous ? Par raison vous ne pouvez faire ni l’un ni l’autre. Par raison vous ne pouvez défendre nul des deux. > >Ne blâmez donc pas de fausseté ceux qui ont pris un choix, car vous n’en savez rien. – Non, mais je les blâmerai d’avoir fait, non ce choix, mais un choix, car encore que celui qui prend croix et l’autre soient en pareille faute, ils sont tous deux en faute. Le juste est de ne point parier. > >Oui, mais il faut parier. Cela n’est pas volontaire, vous êtes embarqué. Lequel prendrez‑vous donc ? Voyons. Puisqu’il faut choisir, voyons ce qui vous intéresse le moins. Vous avez deux choses à perdre : le vrai et le bien, et deux choses à engager, votre raison et votre volonté, votre connaissance et votre béatitude ; et votre nature a deux choses à fuir, l’erreur et la misère. Votre raison n’est pas plus blessée, puisqu’il faut nécessairement choisir, en choisissant l’un que l’autre. Voilà un point vidé. Mais votre béatitude ? Pesons le gain et la perte en prenant croix que Dieu est. Estimons ces deux cas : si vous gagnez, vous gagnez tout, si vous perdez, vous ne perdez rien. Gagez donc qu’il est sans hésiter. – Cela est admirable. Oui, il faut gager. Mais je gage peut‑être trop. Voyons. Puisqu’il y a pareil hasard de gain et de perte, si vous n’aviez qu’à gagner deux vies pour une, vous pourriez encore gager. Mais s’il y en avait trois à gagner, il faudrait jouer (puisque vous êtes dans la nécessité de jouer), et vous seriez imprudent, lorsque vous êtes forcé à jouer, de ne pas hasarder votre vie pour en gagner trois à un jeu où il y a pareil hasard de perte et de gain. Mais il y a une éternité de vie et de bonheur. Et cela étant, quand il y aurait une infinité de hasards dont un seul serait pour vous, vous auriez encore raison de gager un pour avoir deux, et vous agiriez de mauvais sens, étant obligé à jouer, de refuser de jouer une vie contre trois à un jeu où d’une infinité de hasards il y en a un pour vous, s’il y avait une infinité de vie infiniment heureuse à gagner : mais il y a ici une infinité de vie infiniment heureuse à gagner, un hasard de gain contre un nombre fini de hasards de perte, et ce que vous jouez est fini. Cela ôte tout parti. Partout où est l’infini et où il n’y a pas infinité de hasards de perte contre celui de gain, il n’y a point à balancer, il faut tout donner. Et ainsi, quand on est forcé à jouer, il faut renoncer à la raison pour garder la vie plutôt que de la hasarder pour le gain infini aussi prêt à arriver que la perte du néant ([[Pascal, 1670]]). >[!quote]- English translation >Let us then examine this point, and say, "God is, or He is not." But to which side shall we incline? Reason can decide nothing here. There is an infinite chaos which separated us. A game is being played at the extremity of this infinite distance where heads or tails will turn up. What will you wager? According to reason, you can do neither the one thing nor the other; according to reason, you can defend neither of the propositions. > >Do not then reprove for error those who have made a choice; for you know nothing about it. "No, but I blame them for having made, not this choice, but a choice; for again both he who chooses heads and he who chooses tails are equally at fault, they are both in the wrong. The true course is not to wager at all. > >Yes; but you must wager. It is not optional. You are embarked. Which will you choose then? Let us see. Since you must choose, let us see which interests you least. You have two things to lose, the true and the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun, error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather than the other, since you must of necessity choose. This is one point settled. But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation that He is.—"That is very fine. Yes, I must wager; but I may perhaps wager too much."—Let us see. Since there is an equal risk of gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead of one, you might still wager. But if there were three lives to gain, you would have to play (since you are under the necessity of playing), and you would be imprudent, when you are forced to play, not to chance your life to gain three at a game where there is an equal risk of loss and gain. But there is an eternity of life and happiness. And this being so, if there were an infinity of chances, of which one only would be for you, you would still be right in wagering one to win two, and you would act stupidly, being obliged to play, by refusing to stake one life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances there is one for you, if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain. But there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite. It is all divided; wherever the infinite is and there is not an infinity of chances of loss against that of gain, there is no time to hesitate, you must give all. And thus, when one is forced to play, he must renounce reason to preserve his life, rather than risk it for infinite gain, as likely to happen as the loss of nothingness ([[Pascal, 1670]]). >[!note] >Ever since I first read about Pascal's wager in my youth, I dismissed it for two reasons that seemed obvious to me: > >1. One cannot just *will* oneself into having faith by reason alone; there is an insurmountable gap between acknowledging that it *might* be game-theoretically preferable to believe in God, or even declaring "I believe in God", and actually believing in God. > >2. Even that game-theoretic superiority of believing in God, as taken for granted by Pascal, is questionable. Pascal concludes his argument by stating that there is nothing to lose by believing; but the opportunity cost of believing, expressed in terms of life choices, is positive. The counter-argument to that, of course, is that the loss is finite, and the gain infinite; but that finite loss becomes nearly infinite if there is no afterlife, and someone squanders away part of this life by living according to some set of religious rules. > >However, in the spirit of [[Steelmanning|steelmanning]], I can conceive of a more charitable interpretation of Pascal's wager: that it forms a compelling argument for *considering* God and God's existence seriously, i.e. examining the question critically to reach an informed decision, at least once in a lifetime (even later in life, since the Christian God at least allows for late conversion and salvation). Even if one's conclusion is to remain agnostic, this is motivation enough to make it an informed choice. >[!related] >- **North** (upstream): [[Decision theory]] >- **West** (similar): [[Kierkegaard’s leap of faith]] >- **East** (different): [[Evidentialism]] >- **South** (downstream): [[Infinite utility argument]]