>[!abstract] >A **Schelling point** (named after American economist Thomas Schelling) or **focal point** is the natural equilibrium that participants reach in a coordination game where no information is exchanged. >[!quote] >People can often concert their intentions or expectations with others if each knows that the other is trying to do the same ([[Schelling (1960)|Schelling, 1960]], p. 74). >[!example] >Thomas Schelling provides several examples of coordination games leading to focal points in [[Schelling (1960)]]. In one of them (p. 73–74), he gave a group of students the following coordination problem: > > You are to meet somebody in New York City. You have not been instructed where to meet; you have no prior understanding with the person on where to meet; and you cannot communicate with each other. You are simply told that you will have to guess where to meet and that he is being told the same thing and that you will just have to try to make your guesses coincide. > > You were told the date but not the hour of the meeting; the two of you must guess the exact minute of the day for meeting. At what time will you appear at the meeting place that you elected? > >The results showed ”an absolute majority [of students] managing to get together at Grand Central Station (information booth), and virtually all of them succeeded in meeting at 12 noon“ ([[Schelling (1960)|Schelling, 1960]], p. 353). >[!related] >- **North** (upstream): — >- **West** (similar): — >- **East** (different): — >- **South** (downstream): —