>[!abstract] >A semantic paradox, as defined by [[Ramsey, 1925|Ramsey (1925)]], is one that arises from the self-referential use of language and the semantics of truth or meaning, rather than from the formal rules of logic. The classic example is the [[Liar's paradox|liar paradox]], where a sentence refers to its own truth value in a way that generates contradiction. Unlike [[Logical paradox|logical paradoxes]], which expose structural issues in formal systems, semantic paradoxes expose ambiguities and circularity in the relationship between language and truth. Ramsey viewed these as rooted in linguistic self-reference and meaning, highlighting the need for clearer distinctions between language levels, a concern later formalized in Tarski’s hierarchy of languages. >[!quote] >Group A consists of contradictions, which, were no provision made against them, would occur in a logical or mathematical system itself. They involve only logical or mathematical terms such as class and number, and show that there must be something wrong with our logic or mathematics. But the contradictions of Group B are not purely logical, and cannot be stated in logical terms alone, for they all contain some reference to thought, language, or symbolism, which are not formal but empirical terms ([[Ramsey, 1925]]). >[!related] >- **North** (upstream): [[Paradox]] >- **West** (similar): — >- **East** (different): [[Logical paradox]] >- **South** (downstream): —