>[!citation] >Axelrod, R. and Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. *Science*. 211(4489): 1390–1396. https://doi.org/fhfps5. >![[Index of references.base#citation|no-toolbar]] >[!abstract] >Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.