>[!citation] >Hoover Institution. (2025, April 17). *Fireside chat with Stephen Kotkin & US House Select Committee on China* [Video]. YouTube. https://youtu.be/4aQfzDs7RzI >[!abstract] Summary >A one-hour interview of Prof. Stephen Kotkin from Stanford’s [[Hoover Institution]] by two members of the U.S. House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (John Moolenaar, US Representative for Michigan's 2nd congressional district, and Raja Krishnamoorthi, US Representative for Illinois's 8th congressional district). Prof. Kotkin articulates the following positions: > >- China follows a Leninist regime (not so much Marxist) in that the CCP has the monopoly of power and inserts itself into all institutions both public and private. >- The regime’s main goal is its own perpetuation, which limits how much it can open up China both economically and politically. >- China was historically a superpower and the rise of the United States as a free and open hegemon challenges threatens the CCP’s continued existence. >- Maintaining the status quo of strategic competition (i.e., a Cold War) with China is the preferred scenario — shaping international alliances to be more favorable to the US without giving the CCP a pretext to act aggressively e.g. toward Taiwan. >[!tips] Thoughts >- John Moolenaar opens with a statement that the US may need to consider a high price for decoupling its economy willingly from China; which only raises the risk of a hot war (shared economic interests has been a foundation of post-WW2 peace in Europe and the main rationale for founding the EU). The unaddressed alternative would be to intensify the trade partnerships between the two countries, and quarantine the conflict to just one of political differences. >- Prof. Kotkin presumes that a secondary goal of the CCP is to restore China’s perceived greatness, but does not present evidence for why this implies territorial expansion, as opposed to focusing inward on making the country in its current borders as strong and influential as possible (incl. through recovering demography, a robust economy, a technological leadership, and international alliances). It is possible that the CCP already sees territorial expansion as too risky relative to the rewards. >- Prof. Kotkin assumes that the CCP sees the US hegemony as a challenge in itself, but the CCP and China’s economy have greatly benefited from US trade. There is a lack of consideration for the alternative that the CCP cares little about the US relative to its own domestic affairs, and has limited appetite for strategic competition. Conversely, there is no view expressed that the US might just recognize and accept the CCP’s existence in perpetuity. >- The notion that appeasement leads to hot wars has some historical merit, but each situation being unique, we might not be giving enough consideration to whether de-escalation and active, good-faith cooperation might be a superior path to a Cold War. I otherwise agree that a hot war must be avoided at all cost (everybody loses) and that the Pygmalion strategy is unlikely to work. Yet there is an underlying current of wanting the CCP to go away or reform, or else Prof. Kotkin would not be discussing a Cold War in the first place (the reason for the tension is the fundamental differences in the political systems of both countries). >- Prof. Kotkin presents maintaining the status quo regarding Taiwan as a de facto necessity, and mentions Taiwan’s democratic system, free and open economy, and unwillingness to be under CCP rule. It is a question, however, as to whether the US are genuinely willing to support Taiwan for these reasons, at the expense of risking a conflict with China. The current U.S. administration’s position about Ukraine (“not our war”) suggests that the U.S. appetite for defending Taiwan at all costs may be limited. >- The strategic competition view as presented by Prof. Kotkin still sounds confrontational — essentially a perpetual Cold War, always on the brink of a hot war but carefully managed so it does not escalate. There is no mention of a “coopetition” model where both countries actively engage in good faith with each other to collaborate much more deeply on key topics (climate change, pandemics, financial stability, innovation and scientific research, academic and cultural exchange programs, etc.) — and quarantine the political differences to the political realm. >[!note] Notes > JM 2:00 > - We're in a cold war with China. > - No clear adversary like KGB but pervasive Chinese surveillance. > - US may need to consider a high price to deal with it — higher prices, lost apps, national service. > SK 4:30 — point #1 > - China is a Leninist system which is uniquely defined by the insertion of the communist party into all institutions public and private. > - You cannot be half-communist, like you cannot be half-pregnant. > - The system needs full monopoly of the communist party or it falls apart (as seen in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, USSR). > - The CCP won't open up because it knows well that there is no political reform equilibrium in a communist system; there's no way to stabilize an open communist party because tolerating debate will cause its unraveling (people wanting to form other parties). > - Even economic reform presents a threat; the CCP needs the private sector to provide the wealth, the GDP growth, and the jobs; but the CCP does not want independent sources of wealth and power. > - What Deng Xiaoping did (the "three represents") was to allow private sector business people to become members of the CCP as a way to co-opt the private sector. > - This failed and only increased corruption, so Xi Jinping tried to bring the CCP into the private sector instead (accept party supervision inside Board and higher management structures). > - So, ==the CCP has self-imposed limits on how much it can open up, politically and economically==. > - So wanting to steer the CCP to open up and adopt rule of law is nonsensical — that would be suicide for them. They literally cannot do what we've been wanting them to do. > SK 11:45 — point #2 > - Key goal of the system: > - Maintain the survival of the party's monopoly. Everyone in the CCP is committed to that. > - Restore the perceived greatness of China. Here, the appetite grows in the eating. If Xi Jinping achieves dominance in East Asia, he'll be on his way to more global dominance. > - The US system as a freer, open, successful alternative is a fundamental threat to China. Whether the US are more or less aggressive toward China is irrelevant; the US stands in the way of China no matter way. > - Historically, China was a superpower long before the US even existed. However between 1800 to the 1970s, China had a long period of depredation and declined, while America rose in parallel. By the time China emerged again in the 1980s and 1990s, the US had come this global superpower. So, managing American power is a new dilemma for China: how to make the world safe for their regime. > - Therefore ==the challenge is not America's policy but the nature of China's regime==. > - So this challenge is not a misunderstanding. > - The question is not whether the US or China are going away — they obviously aren't. > - The question is: how do we share the world? Can the US get more favorable terms in dealing with this Leninist regime that is preoccupied with its survival and has a hard time reconciling the US position in the world with it. > SK 18:35 — why I don't use the word Marxist-Leninist > - Avoid the word Marxism because the usual counter is that the CCP cares about power and getting rich and so the rest of the argument gets dismissed. > - It's possible to be cynical about Marxism and be a Leninist regime with a communist monopoly on power. > - Marxism has two fundamental components: > - Anti-capitalism > - Anti-imperalism > - The CCP isn't necessarily anti-capitalist (although Xi Jinping has more Marxist leanings than Jiang Zemin) but has retained the anti-imperialist (anti-Americanist) trait. > - As much as there is debate about China is still Marxist, there's no debate that it's Leninist. > SK 21:30 — Cold War lessons > - Looking at history when two great powers faced each other, there were really only four policy options: > - Hot war: the worst outcome. The outcome is catastrophic even if you win. There were 55M casualties in WW2, a multiple of WW1; and WW3 would have a multiple of WW2. The cost of winning is intolerable. > - Appeasement / capitulation: you keep giving in, and ==you still get a hot war anyway== because the appetite grows in the eating. > - Pygmalion: make China a responsible stakeholder in the international system, i.e. transform from the outside a grand Eurasian civilization that predates the US by millennia. It's an illusion that doesn't work — they don't want to be transformed by the US, they want to transform the international system to their benefit. > - Strategic competition / Cold War. That doesn't mean only tension: there was tremendous cooperation between the US and USSR in the Cold War in science, space, etc. You can manage the rivalry through Cold War. > - Also, the US won the Cold War and the prize was an aggressive Russia. There is no historical Cold War equivalent to winning a hot war, only a different form of strategic competition (Russia is smaller than the USSR, further away from Europe, etc.). > - So we shouldn't see Cold War as something to be won — you get to shape the external environment to your advantage, without provoking the other party into a hot war, without becoming like the other in the process. > - Losing is becoming more like them: e.g. becoming more authoritarian, censor, putting government controls to the economy, etc. > - On the contrary, the US needs to play to its advantages: the market economy, the separation of powers, the free and open society... The US need to be who they are. > - So, ==Cold War is an achievement in itself==. It doesn't have to have an end like a hot war. > SK 30:50 — Xi Jinping vs Taiwan > - Calculated risk (opportunist, e.g. Stalin) vs. uncalculated risk (gambler, e.g. Hitler). "Rolling the iron dice". > - Xi Jinping doesn't reveal his thinking to anyone even the inner circle. > - Regardless, the US goal should be to increase the sense of risk for him. For example: > - If he reunites Taiwan with China, he goes down in the books at a great leader who unified both territories. > - If he tries and fails, he goes down as the person who lost the Communist regime because he was unnecessarily aggressive and put the regime at risk. > - So the US response needs to be partly military (deterrence incl. with regional allies), but also political: a message to the Chinese that any action against Taiwan puts the existence of the Chinese regime at stake. > - Xi Jinping is one guy making $100T decisions, effectively. > - The US need to aggregate their power — with alliances and friends, incl. 80 bilateral and multilateral treaties — to really emphasize the risk to the Chinese regime of attempting anything against Taiwan. > SK 40:15 — Is strategic ambiguity useful? > - The status quo works in favor of the US — the Chinese are the ones trying to change it. Under the status quo, Taiwan remains a self-governing entity that is democratic, vibrant, open, etc. Maintaining this is a victory — that's the job. > - The US must be very careful not to give any pretext to the Chinese to change the status quo; then the Chinese can blame the US for that change. > - What is working in Ukraine is this idea that "if you take it, you can't have it" — i.e., if you take over a land militarily, all you'll receive is a smoking pile of rubble (coal mines are flooded, agricultural fields are mined, metal factories and ports are destroyed, etc.). The occupied land is a moonscape. > - So the goal of the CCP is not to take Taiwan by force, because otherwise they can't have it. So war is a problem for China too, because it results in a smoking pile of rubble. > - So the US need to prepare for a blockade scenario with a customs post on the other (Eastern) side of Taiwan. > - However if Taiwan declares independence in law, China will destroy Taiwan under the proviso that if China can't have it, nobody can have it. > - It's the same asymmetry in Ukraine — Ukraine doesn't have another country. Putin doesn't need Ukraine, but Ukraine needs Ukraine. > SK 47:20 — What does winning the strategic competition look like? > - The US needs to double down on education — 32M 18–14 year-olds in the US, 13M in higher ed, so 19M not in higher ed. They need AI-inflicted vocational training. Of the 13M in higher ed, only 100K are in Ivy League + unis. Winning is investing in all those people and train them to work the jobs of the 21st century. > - So winning is not winning militarily against the Chinese — it's America being a better version of itself. > RK 54:00 — Concluding remarks > - The US need to be united and bipartisan on this. The Chinese see the US as divided (Wang Huning, the Xi Jinping whisperer, wrote "America against America" about a tribal, partisan, divided US).